In the standard setting of broadcast encryption, information about the receivers is transmitted as part of the ciphertext. In several broadcast scenarios, however, the identities of the users authorized to access the content are often as sensitive as the content itself. In this paper, we propose the first broadcast encryption scheme with sublinear ciphertexts to attain meaningful guarantees of receiver anonymity. We formalize the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption (oABE), and describe generic constructions in the standard model that achieve outsider-anonymity under adaptive corruptions in the chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext settings. We also describe two constructions with enhanced decryption, one under the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model, and the other under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the standard model.
Introduction
Conventional encryption provides the means for secret transmission of data in point-to-point communication. The setting of broadcast encryption [5, 20] , instead, consists of a sender, an insecure unidirectional broadcast channel, and a universe of receivers. When the sender wants to transmit some digital content, it specifies the set of authorized receivers and creates an encrypted version of the content. A secure broadcast encryption scheme enables legitimate receivers to recover the original content, while ensuring that excluded users just obtain meaningless data, even in the face of collusions.
The intrinsic access control capabilities of broadcast encryption schemes make them a useful tool for many natural applications, spanning from protecting copyrighted content distributed as stored Table 1 : Comparison of the main efficiency parameters of our oABE schemes with [4] and [27] . Our constructions trade full anonymity (achieved by [4, 27] ) for sublinear ciphertexts. The second half shows the schemes with a tagging mechanism allowing only 1 decryption attempt per ciphertext. N is the total number of users in the system. r is the number of revoked users of a ciphertext. 
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MPK
The Subset Cover Framework
The subset cover framework proposed by Naor et al. [28] is an environment for defining and analyzing the security of revocation schemes in the private-key setting, where only the Center can broadcast.
The main idea of this framework is to define a collection S of subsets of the universe of users U = {1, . . . , N } in the system, and assign each subset S j ∈ S a long-lived key, which is also provided to the users belonging to S j . When broadcasting a message m, first the Center determines the set of revoked users R, then it finds a set of disjoint subsets C from the collection S that "covers" the set U\R of receivers, and finally it encrypts the short-lived session key used to encrypt m under all the long-lived keys associated with each subset in C.
In [28] , the authors also provide two instantiations of revocation schemes in the subset cover framework, namely the complete subtree (CS) method and the subset difference (SD) method. In the CS method, the key assignment is information-theoretic but the ciphertext is O r log N r long, whereas in the SD method, the ciphertext length is O(2 r − 1) but the key assignment is computational, where r is the number of revoked users. Although the ciphertext length of the CS method is asymptotically bigger than that of the SD method, we are still interested in the CS method due to its information-theoretic key assignment nature, which seems to be crucial for efficiently preserving the anonymity of the receivers.
Complete Subtree Method. In the CS method as introduced in [28] , the N users in the system are represented as the leaves of a full binary tree T . Since this requires N to be a power of 2, dummy users are added to the system in case N is not a power of 2. The collection S contains all possible complete subtrees of T . More precisely, S contains a subtree for every node v j ∈ T . Since there are 2N − 1 nodes in T , |S| = 2N − 1.
As for key assignment, every subtree in S is assigned a long-lived secret key which is also made available to the users (leaves) of the given subtree. Since any user u i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is a member of all the subtrees rooted at each node v j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ log N + 1, in the path from the root of T down to u i , the length of the user secret key is O(log N ).
The ciphertext length in the CS method is O(r log( N r )) due to the fact that a logarithmic number of subtrees is required to exclude each of the r revoked users (see [28] for further details).
Extension of the CS Method to the Public-Key Setting. As mentioned earlier, the original CS method applies in the private-key setting. Thus, only the Center can broadcast since only it knows all the long-lived keys associated with each subtree in S. In [16] , Dodis and Fazio extended the original CS method to the public-key setting by using a two step process.
The first step is a unique assignment of hierarchical identifiers (HID) to the nodes in T as follows. First, assign the root of T a special identifier (ID), which we refer to as Root. Then, assign each edge of T with ID ID ∈ {0, 1} depending on whether the edge connects its parent node to the left or right child. Now, the HID HID i of any node v i ∈ T can be computed by concatenating all the edge IDs starting from the root of T down to v i and then pre-pending the root ID at the front. Since any prefix of the HID HID i of v i represents the valid HID of a parent node of v i , for the simplicity of notation, we denote by HID i|j the prefix of the hierarchical identifier HID i of length j.
The second step is to use identity-based encryption, further explained in Sect. 2.2 , to encrypt the short-lived session key during broadcast, essentially porting the original CS method to the public-key setting. This allows any user to broadcast a message since the tree structure of the users T and the HIDs of the roots of the subtrees of T are publicly known. In this setting, the Center acts as the trusted authority to provide each user with the log N + 1 IBE secret keys of the HIDs of the roots of the subtrees that the user belongs to.
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (AIBE)
Identity-based encryption (IBE), originally proposed by Shamir in [30] , is a public key encryption scheme in which the user public key is an arbitrary bit-string and the user secret key is generated by a trusted authority known as the private-key generator (PKG) using its master key. The first implementation of this scheme was given in [7] (further implementations can be found in [6, 8, 31] to name a few).
An IBE scheme is called anonymous, formally called anonymous identity-based encryption (AIBE), if an adversary cannot distinguish the identity under which a ciphertext is generated. This notion of anonymity was first introduced in [2] . Subsequent implementations can be found in [12] and [22] . Given below is the formal definition of an AIBE scheme. We refer the reader to [2] for further details including the formal definition of security. Definition 2.1: An anonymous identity-based encryption scheme, associated with a message space MSP, and a ciphertext space CSP, is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial algorithms (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec) such that:
The initialization algorithm Init takes as input the security parameter 1 λ , and outputs the master public key MPK and the master secret key MSK of the system.
sk ID ← Ext(MPK, MSK, ID):
The key extraction algorithm Ext takes as input the master public key MPK, the master secret key MSK, and an identifier ID ∈ {0, 1} * . It outputs the secret key sk ID capable of decrypting ciphertexts intended for the holder of the given identifier ID.
c ← Enc(MPK, ID, m):
The encryption algorithm Enc algorithm takes as input the master public key MPK, an identifier ID ∈ {0, 1} * , and a message m ∈ MSP. It then outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CSP.
m/⊥ := Dec(MPK, sk ID , c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key sk ID , and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP, the decryption algorithm Dec either outputs a message m ∈ MSP or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Dec is deterministic.
Correctness.
For every ID ∈ {0, 1} * and every m ∈ MSP, if sk ID is the secret key output by
Weakly Robust AIBE. The Robust Encryption, formalized by Abdalla et al. [3] , requires that it is hard to produce a ciphertext that is valid for two different users. In [3] , the authors define two types of robustness, strong and weak. Informally, an AIBE scheme is called weakly robust, if any adversary has negligible advantage in producing two identities ID 0 , ID 1 and a message m such that the encryption of m under ID 0 can be decrypted with the private key associated with ID 1 leading to a non-⊥ result. In [3] , the authors also provide a transformation algorithm which makes possible to obtain a weakly robust AIBE scheme from a regular AIBE one.
3 Outsider-Anonymous Broadcast Encryption (oABE)
The Setting
Definition 3.1: An outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme, associated with a universe of users U = {1, . . . , N }, a message space MSP, and a ciphertext space CSP, is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) such that:
The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and the number of users in the system N . It outputs the master public key MPK and the master secret key MSK of the system.
sk i ← KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i):
The key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input the master public key MPK, the master secret key MSK, and a user i ∈ U . It outputs the secret key sk i of the user i.
c ← Encrypt(MPK, S, m): The Encrypt algorithm takes as input the master public key MPK, the set of receivers S ⊆ U , and a message m ∈ MSP. It then outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CSP.
m/⊥ := Decrypt(MPK, sk i , c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key sk i , and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP, the Decrypt algorithm either outputs a message m ∈ MSP or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Decrypt is deterministic.
Correctness.
For every S ⊆ U , every i ∈ S, and every m ∈ MSP, if sk i is the secret key output by
Notice that the decryption algorithm in the above definition does not require the set of recipients S as an input. We stress that this is crucial for providing any level of anonymity in a broadcast encryption scheme.
The Security Model
Degrees of Anonymity. The degree of recipient-set anonymity captured in our security model, which we call outsider-anonymity, lies between the complete lack of protection that characterizes traditional broadcast encryption schemes as introduced in [20, 23] , and the full anonymity provided in schemes such as [4, 27] . In an oABE scheme, when the adversary receives a ciphertext of which she is not a legal recipient, she will be unable to learn anything about the identities of the legal recipients (let alone the contents of the ciphertext). Still, for those ciphertexts for which the adversary is in the authorized set of recipients, she might also learn the identities of some the other legal recipients. This seems a natural relaxation, since often the contents of the communication already reveals something about the recipient set. At the same time, our new intermediate definition of security might allow the construction of more efficient anonymous broadcast encryption schemes; for example, in Sect. 4 we describe the first broadcast encryption scheme with sublinear ciphertexts that attains some meaningful recipient-set anonymity guarantees.
CCA Security. We now present the security requirements for a broadcast encryption scheme to be outsider anonymous against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). First we define the CCA of an oABE scheme as a game, which we term oABE-IND-CCA, played between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and a challenger C. The security requirement is that A's advantage of winning the oABE-IND-CCA game is negligible. The high-level idea of this game is for any two sets of recipients S 0 , S 1 ∈ U , A cannot distinguish between a ciphertext intended for the recipient set S 0 and a ciphertext intended for the recipient set S 1 given the fact that the A does not possess the secret key of any user in S 0 ∪ S 1 . We require the two sets S 0 , S 1 be the same size in order to avoid trivial attacks. The formal definitions follow.
Definition 3.2:
The oABE-IND-CCA game defined for an oABE scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt), a PPT adversary A, and a challenger C is as follows: Setup: C runs (MPK, MSK) ← Setup(1 λ , N ) and gives A the resulting master public key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set of revoked users Rev to be empty. 
In both cases, C responds as in Phase 1.
Guess:
A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b * .
We refer to such an adversary A as an oABE-IND-CCA adversary. The advantage of A winning the above game is defined as,
The probability is over the random bits used by the adversary A and the challenger C. 1 . Our definition of security of an outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme can be easily transformed to a definition of security of a fully anonymous broadcast encryption scheme by changing the restriction in the Challenge phase, which is currently
Our Constructions
We now present our constructions of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption schemes. In a nutshell, the key point of our constructions is to combine an anonymized version of the public-key extension by Dodis and Fazio [16] of the CS method by Naor et al. [28] with a fully secure weakly robust AIBE scheme such as [22] . Notice that our approach can be seen as a framework for achieving an oABE scheme by using any weakly robust AIBE scheme as an underlying primitive.
The ciphertext length in all constructions is O r log N r times the ciphertext length of the underlying AIBE scheme, and the user secret key length is O(log N ) times the user secret key length of the underlying AIBE scheme, where r is the number of revoked users and N is the total number of users in the system.
We provide two generic public-key constructions: an oABE-CPA-secure construction in Sect. 4 .1 and an oABE-CCA-secure construction in Sect. 4 .2. The limitation with both of these constructions is that on average, the Decrypt algorithm attempts r log N r log N /2 decryption operations of the underlying AIBE scheme. In Sect. 4 .3, we present an enhanced oABE-CCA-secure construction in which for a given oABE ciphertext, the Decrypt algorithm executes a single AIBE decryption operation. A drawback of this construction is that its security can only be proven in the random oracle model. In Sect. 4 .4, we present another enhanced oABE-CCA-secure construction whose security can be proven in the standard model. In Sect. 4 .5 we present a variant of the scheme in Sect. 4 .4 attaining even shorter ciphertexts, at a price on the other parameters, most notably, user storage and decryption complexity. Finally, in Sect. 4 .6, we outline an optimization for the privatekey setting to attain constant key storage at the Center, while maintaining efficient decryption and logarithmic storage at the receivers.
For the simplicity of exposition, our constructions encrypt the actual message m. The ciphertext length could be further reduced by using a hybrid encryption where m is encrypted using a private-key encryption algorithm with a secret key k, and k is then encrypted using the oABE scheme.
In all constructions, T denotes the binary tree of N users in the system with respect to the CS method. For simplicity, we assume that N = 2 n .
A Generic oABE-CPA-Secure Public-Key Construction
Given a weakly robust AIBE scheme Π = (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec), we construct an oABE-CPA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) as follows.
KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i):
. . , ID n ) be the hierarchical identifier associated with user i in the binary tree T .
Output the secret key sk i of user i as
Encrypt(MPK, S, m):
Let Cover be the family of subtrees covering the set of receivers S according to the CS method. For each subtree T j in Cover, let HID j be the hierarchical identifier associated with the root of T j . Let l := |Cover|, r := N − |S| and L := r log
, where dummy is a special identifier used to obtain padding ciphertext components. Output the ciphertext c as
where π : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation. 
Decrypt(MPK,
sk
For
The correctness of this oABE-CPA-secure generic public-key construction follows from the correctness of the underlying AIBE scheme. In Theorem 4.1 (whose proof is provided in App. A.1), we establish the security of this construction based on the security of the underlying AIBE scheme.
Theorem 4.1: If
Parameters. When the above construction is instantiated with Gentry's Fully Secure AIBE scheme in the CPA setting [22] , we obtain the following parameter lengths. Let G and G T be the two groups with prime order q in Gentry's construction. MSK is just one element in Z q and the integer N . MPK is only 3 group elements in G. The user secret key consists of (log N + 1) elements in Z q and (log N + 1) elements in G. The ciphertext consists of r log N r elements in G and 2 r log N r elements in G T . Also notice that the Enc algorithm in Gentry's AIBE-CPA-secure scheme does not require any pairing computations since they can be precomputed.
A Generic oABE-CCA-Secure Public-Key Construction
Given a weakly robust AIBE scheme Π = (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec) and a strongly existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign, Vrfy), we construct an oABE-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) as follows.
KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i):
Let HID i := (Root, ID 1 , . . . , ID n ) be the hierarchical identifier associated with user i in the binary tree T . For k := 1 to n + 1, compute sk i,k ← Ext(MPK , MSK , HID i|k ). Output the secret key sk i of user i as
Encrypt(MPK, S, m):
Generate (VK, SK) ← Gen(1 λ ). Let Cover be the family of subtrees covering the set of receivers S according to the CS method. For each subtree T j in Cover, let HID j be the hierarchical identifier associated with the root of T j . Let l := |Cover|, r := N − |S| and L := r log Otherwise, continue to next j.
The correctness of this oABE-CCA-secure generic public-key construction follows from the correctness of the underlying signature and AIBE schemes. In Theorem 4.2 (proof given in App. A.2), we establish the security of this construction.
Theorem 4.2: If
Parameters. The parameter lengths of the above construction when instantiated with Gentry's Fully Secure AIBE scheme in the CCA setting [22] are as follows. Let G and G T be the two groups with prime order q in Gentry's construction. MSK is one element in Z q and the integer N . MPK consists of 5 group elements in G and the definition of a hash function H from a family of universal one-way hash functions. The user secret key consists of 3(log N + 1) elements in Z q and 3(log N + 1) elements in G. The ciphertext consists of r log N r elements in G and 3 r log N r elements in G T . Similar to Gentry's AIBE-CPA-secure construction, the Enc algorithm in the AIBE-CCA-secure construction does not require any pairing computations since they can be precomputed.
An Enhanced oABE-CCA-Secure Public-Key Construction in the Random Oracle Model
The main limitation of our generic public-key constructions is the running time of the decryption algorithm. As described in the opening paragraphs of Sect. 4, decryption amounts to performing r log N r log N /2 AIBE decryption attempts on average. The root cause behind this limitation is the decryption process's inability to identify the correct AIBE ciphertext component efficiently.
In this section, we describe an enhancement of our generic public-key construction under the Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model. The main idea of this enhancement is to adapt the techniques of [4] to the structure of our ciphertexts and attach a unique tag to each AIBE ciphertext component of a given oABE ciphertext. With this optimization, the Decrypt algorithm is able to identify the correct AIBE ciphertext component via a linear search through the whole oABE ciphertext components, at which point a single AIBE decryption operation suffices to recover the original plaintext. This yields an asymptotic decryption time of O r log N r log N , but in fact this is in a sense an overestimate, since the cost of searching for the correct ciphertext component is much less than carrying out multiple decryption attempts.
Given a weakly robust AIBE scheme Π = (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec) and a strongly existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign, Vrfy), we construct an oABE-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) with enhanced decryption as follows. In this construction, G = g denotes a group with prime order q > 2 λ in which CDH is hard and DDH is easy and g is a group generator. H : G → {0, 1} λ is a cryptographic hash function that will be modeled as a random oracle in the security analysis. (c 1 , c 1 [1,n+1] and {c j } j∈ [1,L] as follows. 1 . Initialize H to be empty. 
For
k := 1 to n + 1 a. Insert (tag k , k) in H.
An Enhanced oABE-CCA-Secure Public-Key Construction in the Standard Model
In this section, we augment the construction in Sect. 4 .3 so that its security can be proven in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption using techniques from [27] . The key ingredient of this modification is the "trapdoor test" of the twin Diffie-Hellman problem [13] . Let Π = (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec) be a weakly robust AIBE scheme and Σ = (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) a strongly existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme. We construct an oABE-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) with enhanced decryption in the standard model as follows. In this construction, G = g denotes a group with prime order q > 2 λ in which DDH is hard and g is a group generator. i,1 , sk i,1 , . . . , sk i,n+1 , sk i,n+1 and the ciphertext c as (σ, VK, c = (c 0 ,
If m can be parsed as VK m and Vrfy(VK, σ, c ), return m. b. Otherwise, return ⊥. 
An Enhanced oABE-CCA-Secure Public-Key Construction with Shorter Ciphertexts
Below we sketch a variation of our techniques from Sect. 4 
.4 that results in an oABE scheme with ciphertext length O(r).
Unfortunately, this very compact ciphertext length comes at a price on the other parameters. The idea is to combine the Dodis-Fazio [16] public-key extension of the SD method by Naor et al. [28] with a fully secure, weakly robust, anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption (AHIBE) scheme with constant ciphertext length such as [14, 15] . Following this approach, we would get the following efficiency parameters.
Ciphertext Length: O(r) AHIBE ciphertexts
Public Key Length: O(N log N ) public tag components
Secret Key Length: O(log 2 N ) AHIBE secret keys and O(N ) secret tag components
Decryption Time: O(N ) tag computation/searching time and one AHIBE decryption attempt
An Enhanced oABE-CCA-Secure Private-Key Construction
The enhanced oABE-CCA-secure public key constructions achieve a major performance gain in the Decrypt algorithm compared to the generic oABE-CCA-secure construction, but it also changes the length of the master public key from O(1) to O(N ). This increase in master public key length may not be a concern for many practical constructions, since the master public key can be stored as a static data file on a server on the Internet and also in users' computers. Still, for the private-key setting it is possible to accommodate storage-sensitive systems and attain constant key storage at the Center, while maintaining efficient decryption and logarithmic storage at the receivers.
In particular, recall from Sect. 2.1 that in the private-key setting, only the Center can broadcast messages to the receivers. Thus, the O(N ) information from which the tags for efficient decryption are created does not need to be published. Therefore, this information can be compressed into O(1) key storage using a standard trick based on any length-tripling pseudo-random number generator G (cf. e.g., the SD method of Naor et al. [28] ). In other words, the random exponents associated with the subtrees of T (cf. Sect. 4.3 ) are now pseudorandomly generated from a single seed, by repeated invocations of G on the left or right third of the result of the previous iteration, based on the path to the root of the subtree at hand. Finally, upon reaching the subtree root, the middle third of the pseudorandom output is used to generate the required exponent.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we introduced the notion of outsider-anonymity in the broadcast encryption setting and showed that it enables efficient constructions of broadcast encryption schemes with sublinear communication complexity and meaningful anonymity guarantees. It remains an interesting open problem to construct receiver-anonymous broadcast encryption schemes that at once afford full anonymity to the receivers and attain performance levels comparable to those of standard broadcast encryption systems.
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A Security Proofs
Notation. U = {1, . . . , N } is the universe of users. T denotes the binary tree of N users in the system with respect to the CS method. Let r be the number of revoked users in the challenge ciphertext and L := r log 
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game Game 0 0 : corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.4 when the challenge bit b * is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 follow exactly as specified in Definition 3. 4 . During Challenge, A gives C two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ MSP and two equal length sets of user identities S * 0 , S * 1 ⊆ U with the restriction that Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅, where Rev is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which will subsequently be sent to A, as follows: 
is similar to Game 0 h−1 , but C computes the challenge ciphertext c * as follows: : is similar to Game 1 k+1 , but the challenge ciphertext c * is now computed by C as follows: 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the AIBE-IND-CPA game with its challenger C as follows. First, B receives the master public key MPK of the AIBE scheme from C . Next, B internally executes the oABE-IND-CPA game with A in order to gain advantage in the AIBE-IND-CPA game.
The specifics of the interaction between C , B, and A are given below.
Setup: B forwards MPK to A. B also initializes the set of revoked users Rev to be empty.
Phase 1:
When A invokes a secret-key query for user i, first, B computes HID i , which is the hierarchical identifier associated with the user i in the binary tree T . Next, for k := 1 to n + 1, B obtains the secret key sk i,k of the identity HID i|k from its challenger C . After adding i to Rev, B sends to A the secret key of the user i as sk i := (sk i,1 , . . . , sk i,n+1 ).
Challenge: B receives from A two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ MSP and two equal length sets of user identities S * 0 , S * 1 ⊆ U with the restriction that Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅. B draws m ←$ {0, 1} |m * 0 | and computes the components of its challenge query as follows:
Observe that the condition Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅, together with the key assignment strategy of the CS method guarantees that the identity id 0 hadn't been queried to B's extraction oracle, and thus this is a valid challenge query to C .
B sends the two identities id 0 , id 1 and the two messages m 0 , m 1 as the challenge query to C . C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends c ← Enc (MPK , id b , m b ) to B.
Finally, B computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which is eventually sent to A, as follows: 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma A.1, and is therefore omitted.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game Game 0 0 : corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.3 when the challenge bit b * is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 follow exactly as specified in Definition 3.3. During Challenge phase, A gives C two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ MSP and two equal length sets of user identities S * 0 , S * 1 ⊆ U with the restriction that Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅, where Rev is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which will subsequently be sent to A, as follows: Game 0 h (1 ≤ h ≤ l 0 ): is similar to Game 0 h−1 , but C computes the challenge ciphertext c * as follows: : is identical to Game 0 l 0
: is similar to Game 1 k+1 , but c * is now computed by C as follows: c π(1) , . . . , c π(L) , where π : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation. 6 . Generate σ ← Sign(SK, VK c ), and set c * := (σ, VK, c ). 
Set c :=
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the AIBE-IND-CCA game with its challenger C as follows. First, B receives the master public key MPK of the AIBE scheme from C . Next, B internally executes the oABE-IND-CCA game with A in order to gain advantage in the AIBE-IND-CCA game. The specifics of the interaction between C , B, and A are given below.
Setup: B forwards MPK to A. B also initializes the set of revoked users Rev to be empty. Finally, B computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which is eventually sent to A, as follows, 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma A.3, and is therefore omitted.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games between the adversary A and the challenger C as follows:
In the first game (Game 0 0 ), A receives an encryption of m * 0 for S * 0 and in the last game (Game 1 0 ), A receives an encryption of m * 1 for S * 1 .
Game 0 0 : corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.3 when the challenge bit b * is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 follow exactly as specified in Definition 3.3. During Challenge, A gives C two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ MSP and two equal length sets of user identities S * 0 , S * 1 ⊆ U with the restriction that Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅, where Rev is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which will subsequently be sent to A, as follows: := c 0 , c π(1) , c π(1) , . . . , c π(L) , c π(L) , where π : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation. 8 . Generate σ ← Sign(SK, VK c ), and set c * := (σ, VK, c ).
Set c
At last, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
: is similar to Game 1 k+1 , but C computes the challenge ciphertext c * as follows:
2. Draw s ←$ Z q , and compute c 0 := g s . 3 . For 
Lemma A. 
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma A.3 and is therefore omitted. The only difference which we should be careful about is the new tag system of the ciphertext components. The challenger can trivially compute these tags as specified in the construction of Sect. 4.3 
If
Step 3 did not result in a valid m, return ⊥ (as the original Decrypt algorithm would have returned).
Challenge: Given two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ MSP and two equal length sets of user identities S * 0 , S * 1 ⊆ U with the restriction that Rev ∩ (S * 0 ∪ S * 1 ) = ∅, B computes the challenge ciphertext c * as follows:
1. Generate (VK, SK) ← Gen(1 λ ). Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma A.6, and is therefore omitted.
3 A slight complication is that, post-challenge, the adversary could try to reuse the c0, c π(1) , . . . , c π(L) components from c * , but combine them with freshc1, . . . ,cL components for some message m of her choice. If a ciphertext so crafted were submitted to the decryption oracle for user u, then B would invoke the special decryption process described in Phase 1, and would be unable to test whether cj = H(Z). However, in order for all the other checks in
Step 3b to go through, m should be equal toVK Z m, for a Z such that (g, X, Y, Z) is a DDH tuple. Clearly, at that point B could simply halt its computation, and output Z as its answer to its CDH challenge.
